Wednesday, 29 December 2010
First Foray into Trading and Seminars
Insider Trading - White Collar Crime
I have written a quick overview:
1) Old approach - Insider Trading is a Narrow Offense
Pre 1989 EC Directive: 1980 CA and 1985 Companies Securities Act (inspired by US I.D. law)
...to disclose the information to the counter party... or not pursue dealing
Individual must have a fiduciary relationship to the company (usually only including Directors)
Directors owe a fiduciary duty to company as a whole...
Post 1989: 89/592/EEC & CJA 1993:
By managing I.D. (issue of CAPITAL MARKETS) with the provisions on I.D. it is clear that UK company law (with emphasis on fiduciary duty to the company) has migrated to securities law.
UK law on I.D. à Governed by: CJA 1993
- Influenced by EC Directive 89/592/EEC
- Designed to coordinate regulations in the EU on insider trading amongst member states (many of which didn’t have laws regarding it)
Outline of offenses
s.52 (1)
Insiders dealing in “price-affected” securities using “inside information”
Elements of the offense:
· Offense must be committed by an individual
· Individual must have information as an “insider”
· Individual must “deal”
· In “price-affected securities”
· “In relation to the information”
· As per s.52 (3) acquisition/disposal on the regulated market – dealing themselves/ professional intermediary...
Two Inchoate I.D. offenses
s.52 (2) (a) Insiders Encouraging others to deal in price-affected securities
Encouraging
· Offense must be committed by an individual
· Individual must have information as an “insider”
· Encourage another to “deal”
· In “price-affected securities”
· “In relation to the information”
· Knowing/having reasonable cause to believe the dealing would take place... As per s.52 (3) acquisition/disposal on the regulated market – dealing themselves/professional intermediary...
s.52 (2) (b) Insiders Disclosing the information to another person
Disclosing
· Offense must be committed by an individual
· Individual must have information as an “insider”
· Discloses it to another – other than in the functions of his employment
· In “price-affected securities”
· “In relation to the information”
Disclosing Offense(s)
s.52 (1)
Dealing in the price-affected securities
s.52 (2) (a)
Encouraging another to deal in the price-affected securities
s.52 (2) (b) + s.52 (3)
Disclosing information
Monday, 20 December 2010
Ministry of Justice - Reforms 2010
Thursday, 16 December 2010
WikiLeaks, Allegations & EU Law
Not only has Mr Assange's activities brought into question the issue of "Free Speech" (notably a right not clearly formalised within the UK Constitution) but it has also called the functioning of the EU's Law Enforcement Procedures into doubt.
Mr Assange has yet to be formally charged with rape, it remains as an allegation. So this clear misuse of the EAW has meant Mr Assange is being held in detention (for an unclear amount of time) without charge. Mark Stephens, the lawyer acting for Mr Assange has outlined that up til now that his client has complied Swedish authorities in this rape claim allegation, but yet no charge was ever brought forward. Guilty before being proven innocent?.
Is this simply a manhunt? brought on by the recent WikiLeaks US Diplomatic Cables publications? Or a just and fair EAW, issued as a result of evidence against Mr Assange in the rape claims?
But only time will tell.... and maybe another WikiLeaks publication no doubt.
Update
Mr Assange's claim for Bail is being heard at Westminister Magistrates Court with a reported hefty £240,000 for bail. this is before he is case for extradition to Sweden is to be heard. His lawyer Mr. Stephen Hunt has described the 'Dickensian Conditions' Mr Assange has endured at Wandsworth Prison where he has been held.
Pictured: Wandsworth Prison - Maybe Sweden isn't so bad after all? Source: Click me
Monday, 6 December 2010
Public Law - Parliamentary Supremacy Skeleton Arguement
A skeleton arguement for a situation between two fictional Statues. The Representation Candidature Act 2006 (RCA 06) and Electoral Reform Act 2009 (ERA 09). The ERA 09 conflicting with the RCA 06, with no clear express repeal of the ERA 09.
This raises a question of the ERA's validity. Furthermore the RCA 06 provides for a majority for the Act to be expressly repealed. A skeleton argument for a moot was prepared.
24th November 2010
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
Between:
_____________________________________________________________
R (on the application of Keene) Appellant
-and-
SSJ Respondent
______________________________________________________________
Skeleton Arguement on Behalf of the Respondent (SSHD)
Facts
· Mr Keene has lived in West Loamshire since only 2008
· Wants to stand as a Candidate for the Parliamentary Election
Keene would be entitled to stand by virtue of s.12 Representation Candidature Act 2006, pre-dating the ERA which states that a candidate can stand for an election who had residency for no less than two years.
· Informed of in illegibility to stand as he didn’t fulfil residence requirements as per s.1 Electoral Registration Act 2009 (ERA 2009). The ERA outlined those wishing to stand as a candidate must have lived in their respective constituency for at least 5 years prior to an Election.
· Keene brought claim for Judicial Review against Secretary of State for Justice (SSJ) arguing that ERA 2009 = invalid... thus entitled to stand as a candidate as per s.12 RCA.
· Claim dismissed on 1st instance by Court who found that s.1 ERA prevailed.
Respondant Submissions
1) Following the cases of: Edinburgh & Dalkeith Railway Co v Wauchope as confirmed in the following case of:Pickin v British Railways Board. There is clear precedent that the Courts are not permitted to question the validity of a statute, or hold that an Act. This is the ‘enrolled act rule’. With regard to this rule, the fact that the House of Commons lacked a 75% majority when voting for the Act is inconsequential and the validity of the case shouldn’t be in question.
2) As per Ellen Street Estates Ltd v Minister of Health Parliament previous acts of Parliament cannot bind its successor
3) There is no indication that the RCA 2006 was expressly repealed, as per s.35 RCA 2006 the 75% majorities required for a repeal/amendments for the Act were not reached. Hence, implied repeal could applicable in this scenario as the ERA 2009 proceeded the earlier RCA 2006. Following Ellen Street Estates v Minister of Healthin this situation the later ERA 2009 should impliedly repeal the earlier and contradicting an RCA 2006. There are limits which apply to the doctrine of implied repeal. As per Thoburn v Sunderland City Council a statue of constitutional (as opposed to an ordinary statue) importance can only be repealed expressly. Applying Laws LJ’s test for a constitutional statute:
Validity of the Electoral Registration Act (ERA) 2009
4. Any argument that the ERA is invalid as it was enacted contrary to the provisions of Section 35(1) of the RCA is rejected. It is a tenet of the British Constitution that a later Parliament cannot be bound by any of its predecessors. The authority for this is Ellen Street Estates v Minister of Health [1934] KB 690. To allow the provision of Section 35(1) to stand would destroy the supremacy of Parliament. It is suggested in R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56 that if an Act of Parliament offends against the constitution, the courts could be bound to strike it out. The provisions of Section 35(1) of the RCA are entirely unconstitutional and should be struck out.
Status of the ERA
5. It has been suggested in R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56 that a constitutional statute might require a super-majority for repeal, as in Section 35(1) of the RCA. For the reasons outlined in above, this does not apply to the RCA, which is not a constitutional statute.
6. For the reasons outlined above the Respondent asks the court to deny the application.
Counsel for the Respondent, 25h November 2010
Monday, 29 November 2010
Employers' Liability for Psychiatric Injury - Its Roots & Development
Pictured: Psychiatric Injury - Source: NesbitLaw
The Liability of Employers under Psychiatric Injury within Negligence.
Employers’ liability claims are based on similar principles to those for negligence, a concept first outlined in Donoughue v Stevenson.[1]Such claims were only limited to physical injury. However cases such as Dulieu v White[2] and a better understanding of occupational stress, employers’ liability has since extended through common-law to include psychiatric injury.[3] For claims of physical injury, there is a non-delegable duty of care on employers to provide a safe system of work and to not expose employees to any reasonably foreseeable risk that can be guarded against (when cost of running the risk is greater than avoiding it). This principle was applied and subsequently developed in cases of psychiatric injury.[4]
Walker v Northumbria County Council[5] was the first successful claim under psychiatric injury caused by work-related stress. In Walker, the plaintiff suffered a second nervous breakdown due to occupational stress after informing his employer of his condition. The employer did not reduce the plaintiff’s workload as was agreed, resulting in the second breakdown.[6] The Court of Appeal ruled the legal issues to be: whether the injury to the claimant was reasonably foreseeable and whether the duty of care to provide a safe system of work should extend to include psychiatric injury. The court ruled in the plaintiff’s favour and held that the employer’s duty of care includes psychiatric harm and this duty was breached after the plaintiff returned to work and had a second reasonably foreseeable nervous breakdown.[7]
The court’s approach in Walker was to apply the rules of negligence and expand them to include psychiatric injury. Coleman LJ believed if the risk of psychiatric injury is foreseeable to the employer, who does not take positive steps to prevent further harm occurring, this would result in a breach of a duty of care, incurring liability.[8] This approach was too firmly based on negligence, as it suggests that were it reasonably foreseeable, an employee would develop a psychiatric illness for doing a type of work, regardless of the employee contractual duties in regard to doing that work, employers would have to re-allocate them other work or provide them with assistance. Otherwise, they were in breach of the duty and would be liable, opening the potential door to claims.[9] Walker didn’t take policy and other issues into consideration, including when and in what circumstances employers’ liability would be appropriate. This could be because the plaintiff in Walker was a case of a second nervous breakdown at work as foreseeablity was assumed, explaining this lack of discussion. Walker arguably opened the ‘flood-gates’ of similar claims, as it made it easier for employees to claim under psychiatric injury, because in order for liability to be incurred, it only needed to be proven the psychiatric harm was reasonably foreseeable.[10] However, as there is an absence of legislation to control work-related stress or the risk to psychiatric injury in the workplace the case protected employee rights, making employers more aware of the stresses of their workers and risks to psychiatric injury.[11]
The principles of Walker were reaffirmed in Hatton v Sutherland[12]. Hatton consisted of four-conjoined appeal cases, where the plaintiffs were claiming psychiatric injury due to occupational stress. The court held in the plaintiffs favour in three of the four cases, providing guidelines for cases of a similar nature. As the cases’ facts related to single nervous breakdowns the legal issues were of understanding what factors constitute reasonable foreseeability and when employer liability is appropriate.[13] Hale LJ ruled employers could assume employees were suitable for the job, unless they were made aware of ‘some particular problem or vulnerability’. [14] This requirement of employers’ awareness was the aspect which made the psychiatric injury reasonably foreseeable. The judgement also opposed Walker’s principle i.e. if reasonable foreseeablility was satisfied, employees could be freed of contractual duties. The judgement also showed a greater leaning towards considering the costs of running the risk of psychiatric injury and avoiding it.[15] Hale LJ believed that even if the psychiatric injury was foreseeable, it should also be considered based on the circumstances, what the employer could and should have done, in deciding whether a breach of duty occurred.[16]
Hatton arguably limited the scope of psychiatric injury making it harder for employees to establish an employer’s breach of duty of care for cases of single breakdowns. This could be due to policy reasons, as the previously opened ‘flood-gates’ in Walker had resulted in more psychiatric injury claims.[17] However, the case was also favourable for employees to an extent, as it suggested that foreseeable risk of psychiatric injury is established if they informed their employer of a ‘particular problem or vulnerability’ which put a duty of care on the employer to assist the employee.[18] Hatton did not however, provide control mechanisms, such as the Alcock test[19], which could result in inconsistencies in the Law, as without these, Hatton’s guidelines could be interpreted as strict, which has occurred in the recent cases of Dickens v 02 plc[20] and Daw v Intel Incorporation[21]. In both cases the defendants argued as they provided counselling services, they could not be in a breach of duty of care, because as ruled by Hale LJ those providing these types of services were ‘unlikely’ to be found in a breach of duty.[22]
Hatton’s guidelines proved to be the authority on cases of psychiatric injury, as shown in Barber v Somerset County Council[23]. Barber was one of the conjoined cases in Hatton where the court ruled in the defendant’s favour, after which the plaintiff appealed to the House of Lords. Barber concerned a plaintiff who had suffered from work-related stress. He had spoken to senior management regarding his condition, after which he became seriously ill and was no longer able to work. The legal issue was whether duty of care required the council to take positive steps to avoid the injury which had been breached. Their Lordships ruled in the plaintiffs favour that a duty of care was owed, which had been breached, and upheld Hale LJ’s guidelines in Hatton, but explained they were not meant to be strict rules.[24] One may argue Barber is of little significance as it only re-iterated Hatton however it showed that the duty of care extends to employers taking positive steps in reducing employee workload[25]
The rulings of Hatton were confirmed in the subsequent Dickens v 02 plc[26] and Daw v Intel Incorporation[27] and Hartman v South Essex NHS Trust[28]. Hartman involved a claimant who disclosed information to the Occupational Health Department regarding a previous mental breakdown, after which had a nervous breakdown, and claimed for psychiatric injury. The legal issue was whether the injury was foreseeable, due to the information that had been submitted. The Court of Appeal upheld Hatton, ruling in the defendants favour, that they couldn’t have been expected to have known of the claimant’s vulnerability. The Court’s approach was to follow Hatton, but still considering each case on its own merits. A possible issue is that it means the extent to which Hatton is followed can vary from case to case, resulting in discrepancies within the law. However, arguably this is the best approach, as it does not limit the courts to use control mechanisms when reaching decisions, thus allowing the common law approach on psychiatric injury to gradually develop.
The common law approach to psychiatric injury has developed since Walker, following the same principles of employer liability for physical damage that a duty of care is owed to provide a safe system of work. However the law on this area is subject to change on a case-by-case basis depending on the legal issues brought forward by future cases.
[1] [1932] AC 562
[2] [1901] 2 KB 669
[3] As per the judgement of Hale LJ in Hatton v Sutherland [2002] All ER para. 4, 7
[4] Hodgson J., Lewthwaite J., Tort Law Textbook, (2nd Edition, 2007) p. 172
[5] [1995] All ER 737
[6] Barret B., Oxford Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 4, p.344
[7] Ibid
[8] As per the judgement of Cole LJ in Walker V Northumbria Country Council [1995] All ER 737
[9] McBride N. J., McBride N., Bagshaw R., Tort Law, (3rd Edition, 2008) p.113
[10] Torrington D., Earnshaw J., Tackling under-performance in teachers (1st Edition, 2003) p.41
[11] Allison Spears, Work-Related Stress, Health and Safety Executive, April 2008, p. 12
[12] [2002] All ER
[13] Hodgson J., Lewthwaite J., op. cit. p. 172
[14] As per the judgement of Hale LJ in Hatton v Sutherland [2002] All ER para. 29
[15] McBride N. J., McBride N., Bagshaw R, op. cit. p.113
[16] As per the judgement of Hale LJ in Hatton v Sutherland [2002] All ER para. 33
[17] Torrington D., Earnshaw J., op. cit. p.41
[18] As per the judgement of Hale LJ in Hatton v Sutherland [2002] All ER para. 29
[19] Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310
[20] [2008] EWCA Civ. 1144
[21] [2007] EWCA Civ. 70
[22] As per the judgement of Hale LJ in Hatton v Sutherland [2002] All ER proposition (11) at para. 43
[23] [2004] All ER 385
[24] Barret B., Oxford Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 4, p.345
[25] Alastair M., Tort, All England Annual Review (2004) para. 28.8
[26] [2008] EWCA Civ. 1144
[27] [2007] EWCA Civ. 70
[28] [2005] EWCA Civ. 06